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18-4-501. Criminal mischief.

Statute text

(1) A person commits criminal mischief when he or she knowingly damages the real or personal property of one or more other persons, including property owned by the person jointly with another person or property owned by the person in which another person has a possessory or proprietary interest, in the course of a single criminal episode.

(2) and (3) Repealed.

(4) Criminal mischief is:

(a) A petty offense when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is less than three hundred dollars;

(b) A class 2 misdemeanor when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is three hundred dollars or more but less than one thousand dollars;

(c) A class 1 misdemeanor when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is one thousand dollars or more but less than two thousand dollars;

(d) A class 6 felony when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is two thousand dollars or more but less than five thousand dollars;

(e) A class 5 felony when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is five thousand dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars;

(f) A class 4 felony when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is twenty thousand dollars or more but less than one hundred thousand dollars;

(g) A class 3 felony when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is one hundred thousand dollars or more but less than one million dollars; and

(h) A class 2 felony when the aggregate damage to the real or personal property is one million dollars or more.

History

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 431, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 40-4-501. L. 77: entire section amended, p. 963, 25, effective July 1. L. 81: entire section amended, p. 975, 12, effective July 1. L. 84: entire section amended, p. 537, 9, effective July 1, 1985. L. 92: entire section amended, p. 435, 5, effective April 10. L. 98: entire section amended, p. 1438, 14, effective July 1; entire section amended, p. 795, 5, effective July 1. L. 99: entire section amended, p. 391, 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1581, 7, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 1904, 3, effective July 1; (3) added, p. 1845, 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 1693, 7, effective July 1. L. 2009: (2) and (3) repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1814, 1, effective August 5. L. 2014: (1) amended and (4) added, (HB 14-1266), ch. 155, p. 534, 1, effective August 6. L. 2021: (4)(a), (4)(b),(4)(c), and (4)(d) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3178, 210, effective March 1, 2022.

Annotations

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 384, Session Laws of Colorado 2007.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Law reviews. For article, "Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session -- Criminal Law and Procedure", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69 (1955). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 39 Dicta 81 (1962).

Annotator's note. Since 18-4-501 is similar to former 49-18-1 and 40-18-5, C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

This section is criminal, and it is not its province to make simply the intentional doing of an unlawful act, which injures another's property, a crime, independent of any evil purpose or intention. Mayn v. People, 56 Colo. 170, 136 P. 1016 (1913); Koch v. People, 71 Colo. 119, 204 P. 332 (1922); Schtul v. People, 96 Colo. 217, 40 P.2d 970 (1935).

Civil prosecution for same acts prohibited by this section has no part in a prosecution under this section. Mayn v. People, 56 Colo. 170, 136 P. 1016 (1913).

There must exist criminal intention. In a prosecution under this section for injury occasioned to a bridge, there can be no conviction, unless a criminal intention on the part of the accused appears. Mayn v. People, 56 Colo. 170, 136 P. 1016 (1913); Schtul v. People, 96 Colo. 217, 40 P.2d 970 (1935).

Criminal intent need not be expressly proved in criminal mischief cases, but may be implied or inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances or from the relation existing between the defendant and the owner of the property injured or destroyed. Schtul v. People, 96 Colo. 217, 40 P.2d 970 (1935).

It must be the direct and not incidental object of an act. Neither the mere concealment of the crime, the omitting of the performance of a statutory duty, nor the mere intentional doing of an act prohibited by statute, constitutes criminal mischief, although it may damage the property of another. A conspiracy with a fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully to injure the property of another is punishable. The mischief must be the direct object of the act, and not incidental to some other lawful or unlawful act, or must be the natural consequence of the act. Schtul v. People, 96 Colo. 217, 40 P.2d 970 (1935).

Abandonment is no defense to completed crime of criminal mischief. People v. Johnson, 41 Colo. App. 220, 585 P.2d 306 (1978).

The damage element in criminal mischief relates to economic loss caused by the knowing infliction of damage to the real or personal property of another. People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983).

Value is an essential element of felony criminal mischief. People v. Cisneros, 193 Colo. 380, 566 P.2d 703 (1977).

Theft distinguished. The gravamen of criminal mischief is the knowing causation of damage to another's property with resulting economic loss to the owner or possessor of the property. The crime of theft, in contrast, is a crime of misappropriation or wrongful taking with no added element of damage or destruction to the property taken. People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983).

Value is relevant to the damage element because an offender cannot cause an economic loss that surpasses the actual value of the property damaged. People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983).

Actual value will generally be determined by market value, that is, the price a willing buyer would pay for the object in the open market. People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983); People v. Dobson, 847 P.2d 176 (Colo. App. 1992).

Unless there is no market for the item. Where, however, there is no market for the particular item, then such factors as the original purchase price, replacement cost, the general use and purpose of the article, and salvage value may be considered as some evidence of actual value. People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983); People v. Dobson, 847 P.2d 176 (Colo. App. 1992).

The crime of criminal mischief is not a lesser included burglary offense because the elements are far different. While criminal mischief requires damage to property, burglary does not. People v. Cisneros, 193 Colo. 380, 566 P.2d 703 (1977).

Criminal mischief involving damage to another's building or occupied structure is included in first degree arson involving burning the same building or occupied structure because first degree arson, by its very nature, occurs in a single criminal episode. People v. Welborne, 2018 COA 127, 457 P.3d 71.

The pulling up of one or more posts of a fence in process of erection warrants a conviction under this section. Olson v. People, 56 Colo. 199, 138 P. 21 (1914).

This section does not apply to the pulling down of a fence by defendant, erected across land claimed by him and in his possession without his consent. Koch v. People, 71 Colo. 119, 204 P. 332 (1922).

Police officer's undisputed testimony of estimated damage is admissible at a preliminary hearing. People ex rel. Russel v. Hall, 620 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1980).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. O'Donnell, 184 Colo. 434, 521 P.2d 771 (1974).

Evidence held insufficient to sustain a conviction. Schtul v. People, 96 Colo. 217, 40 P.2d 970 (1935).

For instructions on previously required element of malice, see People v. Woods, 179 Colo. 441, 501 P.2d 117 (1972).

Instruction on intentional conduct not plain error. An instruction that the culpable mental state for criminal mischief is intentional conduct does not constitute plain error as intentional conduct is a higher degree of culpability than the knowing conduct required by this section, and, therefore, the erroneous instruction actually benefits the defendant. People v. Founds, 631 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1981).

Self-defense instruction inappropriate for charge of criminal mischief where case involved unreasonable or excessive force by police during an arrest. Although self-defense instruction is required when evidence has been presented that officers displayed weapons and were commanded to discharge them in course of effecting arrest and that their conduct was unreasonable or excessive under the circumstances, such instruction was not appropriate as to charge of criminal mischief arising from events after defendant was taken into custody. People v. Fuller, 781 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1989).

But defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense as an affirmative defense when defendant caused property damage in order to distract person grasping defendant. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant knowingly kicked her ex-boyfriend's car door to defend herself by distracting him and by giving herself leverage to pull away from his grasp. People v. Coahran, 2019 COA 6, 436 P.3d 617.

A violation of a local ordinance that does not necessarily violate subsection (1) does not qualify as a countable misdemeanor or a petty offense under the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Abeyta, 877 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2017).

Applied in Corder v. People ex rel. Smiley, 87 Colo. 251, 287 P. 85 (1930); Schindelar v. Michaud, 411 F.2d 80 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956, 90 S. Ct. 426, 24 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1969); People v. Griffith, 197 Colo. 544, 595 P.2d 231 (1979); People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981); People ex rel. Hunter v. District Court, 634 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1981); People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1981); People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1982); People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1982).