As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Premises means any real estate and all improvements erected thereon.
(2) Separate building means each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied.
(3) A person enters unlawfully or remains unlawfully in or upon premises when the person is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to do so. A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or some other authorized person. A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building that is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building that is not open to the public. Except as is otherwise provided in section 33-6-116 (1), C.R.S., a person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land that is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to the person by the owner of the land or some other authorized person or unless notice forbidding entry is given by posting with signs at intervals of not more than four hundred forty yards or, if there is a readily identifiable entrance to the land, by posting with signs at such entrance to the private land or the forbidden part of the land. In the case of a designated access road not otherwise posted, said notice shall be posted at the entrance to private land and shall be substantially as follows:
ENTERING PRIVATE PROPERTY REMAIN ON ROADS.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 426, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 40-4-201. L. 75: (3) amended, p. 634, 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (3) amended, p. 922, 9, effective January 1, 1985. L. 99: (3) amended, p. 326, 1, effective July 1.
Editors note: This title was numbered as chapter 40, C.R.S. 1963. The substantive provisions of this title were repealed and reenacted in 1971, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this title prior to 1971, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. For a detailed comparison of this title, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Editors note: This title was repealed and reenacted in 1971. For historical information concerning the repeal and reenactment, see the editors note following the title heading.
Cross references: For the definition of the word premises as used in criminal trespass, see 18-4-504.5.
A previously granted invitation to enter or remain in a dwelling can be withdrawn at any time by the person with authority to grant the invitation so long as no other license or privilege exists. People v. Murray, 2018 COA 102, 452 P.3d 101.
Burglary of hotel room. Under this section, one who enters a room of a hotel with intent to commit larceny therein is guilty of burglary, and the argument that the offense should have been alleged against the hotel rather than against the guest occupying such room is without merit. Gallegos v. People, 150 Colo. 37, 370 P.2d 755 (decided under former 40-3-6, CRS 53).
Open to the public defined. Open to the public means premises which by their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or lack thereof, or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe no permission to enter or remain is required. People v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916 (Colo. App. 1980).
Theater managers office in a completely enclosed space within theater not open to public for purposes of subsection (3) of this section. Defendants use of a pretense to gain entrance to managers office indicates that he was aware that the office was not open to public and was therefore unlawfully entering premises. People v. Ridenour, 878 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1994).
Defendant entered the premises unlawfully when his possessory interest was subject to the victims continuing consent and victim revoked license or privilege to remain on premises. Defendant was not a tenant with a possessory interest when he did not have a lease or rental agreement and did not pay rent; mere contributions to groceries and other bills did not otherwise create a leasehold interest. People v. Murray, 2018 COA 102, 452 P.3d 101.
Applied in People v. Marshall, 196 Colo. 381, 586 P.2d 41 (1978); Bollier v. People, 635 P.2d 543 (Colo. 1981).